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This paper presents new evidence on intergenerational mobility in the top of the income 
and earnings distribution. Using a large dataset of matched father-son pairs in Sweden, we 
find that intergenerational transmission is very strong in the top, more so for income than 
for earnings. In the extreme top (top 0.1 percent) income transmission is remarkable with 
an IG elasticity above 0.9. We also study potential transmission mechanisms and find that 
sons’ IQ, non-cognitive skills and education are all unlikely channels in explaining this 
strong transmission. Within the top percentile, increases in fathers’ income are, if anything, 
negatively associated with these variables. Wealth, on the other hand, has a significantly 
positive association. Our results suggest that Sweden, known for having relatively high in-
tergenerational mobility in general, is a society where transmission remains strong in the 
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1.  Introduction 
This paper studies intergenerational income mobility focusing on the top of the distribution. 
More precisely, we study the income association of matched father-son pairs, based on a rep-
resentative sample of all men born in Sweden in 1960–1967. Our sample consists of more 
than 100,000 pairs (35 percent of that population), which means that we are able to get good 
precision estimates for fractions as small as 0.1 percent of the income distribution.  
 
There are two main motivations for this study. The first is based on the growing literature on 
top income shares over the long run.
1 Besides giving us new comparable long-run series of 
inequality, this literature has also shown the importance of studying the top in more detail in 
order to understand aspects of overall inequality.
2 In particular, it has been shown that the 
recent surge in inequality in many countries has been driven mainly by large income increases 
in the top percent (or even smaller fractions). However, so far this literature has not explicitly 
studied intergenerational mobility. Understanding mobility is crucial for evaluating inequality 
in general, and the same obviously applies for the recent increase in top income shares. In-
deed, when asked about the fairness of high income concentration, most people respond that it 
crucially depends on how those in the top got there. If success depends on “hard work” or 
being “more skillful”, people seem to tolerate inequality—even high degrees of it. If, on the 
other hand, the rich have reached their position because of inheritance, a certain family envi-
ronment, or “connections and knowing the right people”, this is generally viewed as unfair.
3 
Atkinson and Piketty (2007) point out that the change in top income composition in Anglo-
Saxon countries, where top wage earners have replaced capital income earners, indicate that 
                                                 
1 Starting with Piketty (2001), Atkinson (2004), and Piketty and Saez (2003), a number of studies have followed 
using a common methodology to create homogenous series of top income shares over the long run for a number 
of mainly industrialized countries. Roine and Waldenström (2008) study the Swedish case. Atkinson and Piketty 
(2007, 2010) survey much of this work, its methodology and main findings. 
2 For example, the top income literature has shown that the top decile is typically a very heterogeneous group 
both in terms of income composition (though the composition has also changed over time for some groups) and 
in terms of the volatility of their income share. For most countries it also seems that most of the movement in the 
share of the top decile group is, in fact, driven by the top percent, something which runs the risk of not being 
captured if data is based on smaller, often top-coded samples. 
3 The quotes are formulations from a Gallup poll used in Fong (2001) and questions appearing in the Internation-
al Social Justice Project, but there are many other examples of similar formulations in, for example, the World 
Values Survey, the General Social Survey, the International Social Survey, etc. Some studies have focused on 
the differences in perceptions of why people are rich or poor, and, in particular on the differences between the 
US and Europe with respect to such beliefs (e.g., Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2001, and Alesina and Glaeser, 
2004). However, the opinion that if a person is rich as a consequence of working hard this is fair (and vice versa 
if the person has not made any effort) seems to be shared across countries. For example, Jencks and Tach (2006) 
report that a majority of people in Germany, Japan, U.K. and the U.S. agreed with the statement that “[inequali-
ty] is fair but only if there are equal opportunities” (based on data collected by the International Social Justice 
Project (ISJP) in 1991).   3
today’s income top is not primarily based on inherited wealth. This is supported by the find-
ings in Kopczuk and Saez (2004), who show that the recent increase in income concentration 
in the U.S has not been accompanied by any major increase in wealth concentration, and by 
Edlund and Kopczuk (2008), who proxy wealth mobility in the U.S. by the share of women in 
the top of the distribution, and find that this share has decreased substantially over the past 
decades, also indicating a decreasing role for inheritance among the rich.
4 While these find-
ings are indicative for questions regarding mobility, our study explicitly addresses intergene-
rational associations of top incomes as well as their potential transmission mechanisms. 
 
The second motivation is based on previous research on intergenerational mobility, and in 
particular on the studies that have been concerned with nonlinearities. Most of these studies 
have primarily been interested in differences in mobility patterns across the whole range of 
the bivariate income distribution.
5 In contrast, we focus on the top of the distribution and in 
particular on fractions in the very top that in most of this literature are unusually small. We 
are aware of only two previous studies that share our level of detail in this respect. First, Co-
rak and Heisz (1999) do a thorough exploration of nonlinearities in intergenerational mobility 
for both earnings and income using a very large sample of Canadian men. Even if their sam-
ple size is large enough for them to be able to study small fractions of the distribution, their 
primary focus is on nonlinearities over the whole distribution rather than groups within the 
top. Consequently they choose not to study details of the top in the same way as we do. 
Second, Finnie and Ervine (2006), who also study Canadian data, are explicitly concerned 
with top groups. Their study is, however, different in that they look at the “origins” of indi-
viduals located in today’s top groups by means of a transition matrix. More precisely, they 
trace the decile in the distribution of family market incomes in the early 1980s, from which 
individuals in various top groups have originated. We use several models and techniques that 
are more standard in the intergenerational mobility literature (also including transition matrix-
                                                 
4 Kopczuk, Saez and Song (2010) study within lifetime income mobility in the U.S. and find that the probability 
of remaining in the top percent of the distribution from one period to the next has changed very little over the 
past decades. 
5 For example, Eide and Showalter (1999), Grawe and Mulligan (2002), Couch and Lillard (2004), Grawe 
(2004), Hertz (2005), Jäntti et al. (2006), and Bratsberg et al. (2007) are all (at least partly) concerned with non-
linear patterns in the overall distribution. Typically, these studies are concerned with differences across quartiles 
or deciles rather than percentiles or even fractions of percentiles. This is largely driven by the underlying ques-
tions (such as the impact on the intergenerational elasticity from credit constraint on educational investments), 
but also by the fact that studying small fractions of the distribution requires a very large sample.   4
es). Finally, we also study potential transmission channels, which is something neither of 
these previous studies examine.
6 
 
Studying the same fractile groups and using the same income concepts as in the top income 
literature, we find that: 1) The intergenerational transmission is generally much stronger in the 
very top of the distribution (the top 1 percentile group). In the extreme top (the top 0.1 percen-
tile group) the transmission is remarkably strong, with intergenerational elasticities above 0.9 
in our main specifications. 2) Earnings transmission is also high for these groups but generally 
lower than that for total income, suggesting that capital may play a key role in explaining the 
very strong transmission; 3) When studying channels of transmission, we find that sons’ IQ, 
non-cognitive skills, education as well as wealth, all seem to be positively related to fathers’ 
income in the distribution in general. However, in the top percentile this is only true for 
measures of wealth, which also indicates that the plausible channel of strong transmission in 
the top is capital. Cognitive skills, non-cognitive skills and education are, if anything, nega-
tively related to fathers’ income within the very top of the distribution. 
 
In the next section of the paper we present our data. Section 3 contains our main results on 
intergenerational income associations in the top using both piecewise linear regressions as 
well as quantile regressions. We also present transition matrix results as an alternative meas-
ures of intergenerational mobility. In section 4 we check the robustness of our main results. In 
section 5 we explore possible transmission channels (IQ, non-cognitive skills, education and 
various measures of wealth) and finally, in section 6 we conclude with a discussion of our 
results and also point to some interesting topics for future research. 
2.  Data 
We use Swedish data compiled from administrative registers run by Statistics Sweden. The 
starting point for constructing our data set is a random sample of 35 percent of all men born in 
Sweden between 1960 and 1967. These are the sons in our study. Using the multi-
generational register we can connect them to their biological fathers, and using income regis-
                                                 
6 Corak and Heisz (1999)—like many subsequent studies of nonlinearities—discuss their results in terms of 
possible borrowing constraints on parental investments in human capital of children, but they do not explicitly 
study data for this or any other mechanism. Though not explicitly concerned with the top of the distribution, a 
recent paper by Corak and Piraino (2010) considers a previously overlooked channel. They study to what extent 
fathers and sons have the same employer and find that this “inheritance of employer” is much more common in 
the top of the distribution. This could clearly play a role in understanding nonlinearities.   5
ters we can add annual income data based on compulsory reports from employers to tax au-
thorities or from personal tax returns, to both fathers and sons. 
 
The objective then is to get good estimates of lifetime incomes. For sons we observe their 
incomes during 1996–2005, i.e., when they are in their 30s and early 40s. This is a period in 
life when even annual incomes are shown to be unbiased proxies for lifetime income with 
only classical measurement errors (Böhlmark and Lindquist, 2006). In order to eliminate most 
of the transitory fluctuations, we average their annual incomes over the entire ten-year period. 
 
When measuring fathers’ incomes, we also want a good proxy for long-run income, but there 
are also arguments for measuring income at the time when their children grew up since this 
captures important determinants of the intergenerational transmission of incomes.
7 We meet 
both these requirements by measuring fathers’ income as the average of income during the 
years 1974–1979, i.e., when their sons were between seven and nineteen years old and thus 
mostly living with their parents.
8  
 
We use two concepts of income. The first is total income, which is income from all sources 
(labor, business, capital and realized capital gains) before taxes and transfers.
9 This is the 
same measure as previously used when studying the evolution of top income shares.
10 Our 
estimates of intergenerational mobility in the top, thus, correspond directly to the estimates of 
the static top income inequality. Our second measure is earnings, which includes income from 
work for employees and self-employed.
11 
 
There are of course many specific problems that arise when measuring incomes and earnings 
in the absolute top of the distribution (see Roine and Waldenström (2010) for a detailed dis-
cussion). Overall we are broadly confident that the Swedish register data used in this study 
                                                 
7 Several previous studies in the intergenerational literature have chosen to measure fathers’ incomes in this way. 
See Corak (2006), Björklund and Jäntti (2009), and Black and Devereux (2010) for recent surveys. 
8 This choice is also influenced by the fact that fully comparable measures of income and earnings are only 
available from 1974 onwards. Although we observe incomes since 1968, there was a legal change in 1973–1974 
that made a set of social insurance benefits taxable and from then on also included in the income data. 
9 Total income (sammanräknad nettoinkomst for fathers and summa förvärvs- och kapitalinkomst for sons) also 
includes taxable social insurance benefits such as unemployment insurance, pensions, sickness pay and parental 
leave benefits. 
10 See Roine and Waldenström (2008). 
11 Earnings (arbetsinkomst) is an income concept created by Statistics Sweden by combing wages and salaries 
and business income. It also includes earnings-related short-term sickness benefits and parental-leave benefits 
but not unemployment and (early) retirement benefits.   6
correctly measure top incomes—for example, income tax reports are not only individual but 
employers and financial institutions are also by law required to report what they have paid out 
to individuals and there is no such thing as top coding in the income and earnings registers. In 
addition, the two most important sources of measurement error that may still be present bias 
our results downward implying that, if anything, we underestimate the effects that we find.
12  
 
First, our earnings measure never includes capital incomes even though items such as bonuses 
and realized stock options can be a relatively important form of compensation to top earners. 
To the extent that such capital-based reimbursements have become more prevalent since the 
1970s, which is arguably the case also in Sweden, we systematically underestimate top earn-
ings among sons. Since this mismeasurement of the dependent variable is likely to be posi-
tively correlated with father’s earnings, this potentially leads to underestimating the intergene-
rational transmission for earnings.  
 
Second, after Sweden around 1990 liberalized its capital account there has been a drastic in-
crease in cross-border capital movements among the wealthy. In a recent survey of the Swe-
dish household wealth concentration, Roine and Waldenström (2009) show that significant 
shares of wealth owned by the richest Swedes may be placed in off-shore locations. As a re-
sult, capital income among high-income earning sons could be underestimated. If anything, 
we again risk underestimating the intergenerational transmission. 
 
In addition to studying the intergenerational transmission of earnings and incomes we are also 
interested in analyzing potential mechanisms through which this may work. We consider four 
different channels for which we can obtain good data for the sons in our sample: education, 
IQ, non-cognitive skills, and wealth. Our measure of education is based on Statistics Swe-
den’s education registry. The variable is available in seven levels that we recode to years of 
schooling.
13 Our measures of IQ and non-cognitive ability are obtained from the Swedish mil-
itary’s compulsory enlistment tests that are conducted around age 18.
14 The IQ test has four 
                                                 
12 More precisely Statistics Sweden’s income and earnings data rely on personal tax assessments through 1977 
for wages, salaries, and transfers, and through 1987 for interests and dividends. Thereafter reports come from 
employers (and authorities for transfers) and banks respectively. Thus, our sons’ data come from employers and 
banks and most of our fathers’ data come from personal reports. If anything the latter source introduces some 
measurement error in fathers’ income resulting in an underestimation of intergenerational transmission.  
13 We assign 9 years of schooling for compulsory education, 11 for short high school, 12 for long high school, 14 
for short university, 15.5 for long university, and 19 for Ph.D. 
14 See Cesarini (2010) and Lindqvist and Vestman (2010) for more information about these tests and evaluations 
of them for research purposes like the one in this study.   7
parts (synonyms, inductions, metal folding and technical comprehension), which are reported 
on a scale from 1 to 9. The results of the tests are transformed to an overall measure of cogni-
tive ability, also ranging from 1 to 9. The variable follows a Stanine scale that approximates a 
normal distribution. The measure of non-cognitive skills is the outcome of interviews with the 
conscripts by certified psychologists. The overall objective of these interviews is to assess the 
conscripts’ ability to cope with the psychological requirements of the military service. The 
psychologists assign each conscript a score between 1 and 9, and the variable is constructed to 
follow the Stanine scale with a normal distribution. 
 
We also use three wealth variables. From the wealth register at Statistics Sweden, we retrieve 
market-valued estimates of net worth and financial assets for all individuals in the country. 
Financial assets (bank accounts, ownership of stocks, bonds and mutual funds) and debts (any 
kind) come from statements, which by law must be reported directly by financial firms to the 
tax authorities. From the housing and property registers all private housing and real estate 
(except condominiums) are retrieved. We also use taxable wealth, which is reported by indi-
viduals on their tax returns, but only available for the ones with sufficiently high wealth to be 
taxed (roughly the top fifth). 
 
When determining the sample used in the estimations, we begin by requiring fathers to be 
residents all the years 1974–1979 and sons in all the years 1996–2005. We then use separate 
samples for income and earnings and use only the father-son pairs for whom both had positive 
income observations each observation year, and do the corresponding in the earnings sam-
ple.
15 A further requirement in our main samples is that our potential transmission variables—
education, IQ, non-cognitive skills and wealth—do not have missing values. This, together 
with the requirement of positive values for all years, causes us to lose observations, so we 
therefore also run some robustness checks to see how the results vary when using different 
samples and when including observations with reported zero income and earnings (treating 
the zeros in some alternative ways).
16  
 
                                                 
15 Our income and earnings data come in units of 1 SEK for all but two years when they come in 100 SEK. We 
adjust for this in our analysis by multiplying incomes and earnings in the two latter years by 100. Still, there may 
be a concern that when taking logs of incomes near the lowest income limit the initial difference in limits could 
influence the results. Rerunning the main analysis requiring incomes and earnings to be at least 100 SEK instead 
of just being positive, however, the results (available upon request) do not change. 
16 These results are reported in Section 4.   8
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the income and earnings samples of our main analysis 
as well as descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis of potential transmission 
mechanisms. Our income sample contains 108,277 pairs of fathers and sons and the earnings 
sample contains 85,848 pairs.
17 Thus we observe more than a thousand father-son pairs in the 
top income percentile and over one hundred in the top 0.1 percentile group. The mean and 
median in both the income and earnings samples are about the same for fathers as well as for 
sons. In the top of the distribution, however, incomes are substantially higher, especially for 
the sons. This indicates the importance of analyzing earnings and incomes separately, espe-
cially when studying the top of the distribution. Coefficients of variation are in line with the 
previously documented trends for top income shares in Sweden, which indicate sharp increas-
es for total income but only moderate changes for earnings (see Roine and Waldenström, 
2008, for details). Also we note that the age of fathers is somewhat higher in the income sam-
ple, which is plausible given that few fathers have positive earnings after their retirement at 




3.  Econometric models and main results 
Our point of departure is the prototypical model in intergenerational income mobility research 
 
                    (1) 
 
where     is the natural log of income of a son in family   and     the corresponding measure 
for his father.
19 We want to estimate the intergenerational relationship between long-run in-
comes following the standard approach in the literature, and therefore use multi-year average 
incomes throughout. We also control for father’s and son’s age (linearly and quadratically) in 
all our regressions.  
                                                 
17 These numbers can be compared to 151,148 sons who were born in Sweden in 1960–1967 and resided in 
Sweden all years 1996–2005, that is, the population we want to make inferences about. Table A1 explains how 
the sample changes depending on the requirements we have. In section 4, we examine whether our results are 
sensitive to these decisions and find that they are not.  
18 By running the analysis using only fathers aged 65 or less in both populations we have confirmed that the fact 
that fathers in the income sample are relatively older does not influence our results (these estimates are available 
upon request). 
19 Obviously, it would be interesting to incorporate mothers and daughters too. Here we limit the analysis to 
father-son relations partly to make comparisons with previous studies more straightforward but mainly for data 
coverage reasons.   9
 
The regression coefficient   is the intergenerational elasticity, i.e., it measures the percentage 
differential in sons’ expected income with respect to a marginal percentage differential in the 
incomes of fathers. In case the variance of long-run incomes in both generations is the same, 
the elasticity is also the intergenerational correlation in log incomes. In our study, the distinc-
tion between the elasticity and the correlation is not relevant since we focus on the intergene-
rational transmission in the top of the distributions. 
 
We extend equation (1) in two ways to address two different questions.
20 First, we run sepa-
rate LS-regressions across different father fractiles. More specifically, we run equation (1) 
separately for those father-son pairs where the fathers’ income is in the P0–P90, P90–P95, 
P95–99, P99–P99.9, and P99.9–100 respectively. The interpretation of the coefficient   for 
each of these regressions is, hence, the percentage differential in sons’ expected income with 
respect to a marginal percentage differential in the incomes of fathers given that the father 
had an income in the respective fractile group.
21  
 
Our second approach is to use quantile regressions to analyze how sensitive the Qth percentile 
in sons’ income distribution is to fathers’ incomes (see Koenker and Hallock, 2001). When Q 
is a top income quantile, say the 99th percentile, our estimated parameter tells us how sensi-
tive the top in sons’ income distribution is to differentials in fathers’ incomes. Thus we speci-
fy the following equation for each conditional quantile Q: 
 
                     
   (2) 
 
Our main results from the LS-regressions across father income fractiles are reported in Table 
2. The conventional least squares regression model (1) yields estimates of the intergeneration-
al elasticity of 0.260 for income and 0.168 for earnings when using all observations over the 
                                                 
20 Grawe (2004) uses a model that combines two approaches close to ours, namely spline and quantile regres-
sion. However, this combination is not feasible for us as our focus on the very top of the distribution gives small 
samples. 
21 In a previous version of this paper we used a spline function with knots (chosen by us) at which the slope is 
allowed to change (see Greene, 1997, pp. 388f). We prefer the separate LS-regressions because the spline ap-
proach forces the regression line trough the knots making it more dependent on exactly how the division into 
groups is chosen. As is clear from our results reported in Björklund, Roine and Waldenström (2008), the spline 
approach is qualitatively the same as the LS approach used here.   10
whole distribution.
22 These numbers are in line with previous results for Sweden. When look-
ing at the results across the fathers’ income fractiles these indicate slightly higher numbers in 
the top decile compared to the rest of the distribution, but in particular the elasticities are 
much higher in the top percentile and extreme in the very top. Literally our result for the top 
0.1 group suggests that a 10 percent income differential among high-income fathers is trans-
mitted into a 9.6 percent differential among sons. This should be contrasted against the aver-





Turning to earnings, we find qualitatively similar patterns but with a weaker increase in the 
very top. The coefficient for the top 0.1 percentile group is only half as large as it is for in-
come. This difference among income and earnings suggests that it is the capital income com-
ponent that is strongly inherited at the very top of the distribution. 
 
In the quantile regressions, reported in Table 3, we examine how sensitive sons’ incomes and 
earnings at different levels are to their fathers’ incomes and earnings. Although these regres-
sions measure a different aspect of the intergenerational income association, and consequently 
the respective estimated coefficients cannot be directly compared, the results reveal basically 
the same non-linear patterns as we saw in the LS-regression analysis. In the case of incomes, 
there is a somewhat smoother increase in the degree of persistence across generation over the 
level of sons’ incomes. The median regression, Q50, has an intergenerational elasticity of 
0.274, which is close to the OLS-estimate in table 2. At the 90th quantile, we observe coeffi-
cients of 0.375 and for Q99-coefficient it is 0.455, which implies that a 10 percent income 
differential among fathers is related to a 4.6 percent higher income for sons’ at the 99th quan-
tile of the distribution. Going even further up the income distribution, we find a coefficient of 
0.642 at Q99.9, which is markedly higher than elsewhere in the distribution. The results for 
earnings, however, are much more stable over the sons’ distribution; it is around 0.16 up to 
Q99 and rises to 0.242 at Q99.9.  
                                                 
22 While this difference between income and earnings might appear as striking, it should be noticed that they also 
differ in terms of trends in dispersion. Specifically, using information on the ratio of the standard deviation of 
fathers’ and sons’ long-run incomes fell by 12.5 percent (0.42/0.48) and the corresponding ratio increased by 14 
percent (0.56/0.49) for earnings. In other words, the intergenerational correlations (defined as the estimated in-
tergenerational elasticities multiplied by the ratio of the standard deviations) are 0.23 and 0.19 in the two cases. 
23 It is worth pointing out that this is a measure of the expected transmission given that the father is in this top 
group, rather than a measure of how difficult it is to get to this group. See Hertz (2005) for more on the interpre-




Our results are summarized in Figures 1 and 2. Besides corroborating previous findings on 
average Swedish income mobility they also highlight new evidence on notable nonlinearities 
in this relationship across the distribution of income and earnings. Specifically, we find that 
while the income associations are relatively weak in the population at large this changes mar-
kedly in the top of the distribution. In the absolute top of the distribution we find very strong 
associations and among fathers in the top 0.1 percentile group income increases are almost 
completely transmitted to their sons. These non-linear transmission patterns also prevail in the 
earnings distribution, but to a lesser extent. 
 
[Figures 1 and 2] 
 
Finally, it is illuminating to illustrate the mobility pattern with a transition matrix as well. In 
contrast to the LS and quantile regression results, which show marginal sensitivity in different 
segments of the distribution, transition matrixes show global mobility across the whole distri-
bution. In particular they allow us to study the prevalence of large steps and “unusual events” 
in the income distribution from one generation to the next. Table 4 gives a transition matrix 
for income with the same group limits as in our regressions. The table reveals that 7.3 percent 
of the sons of fathers in the P99.9–100 fractile show up in the same fractile for sons. This 
number is 73 times higher than 0.1, which would indicate independence between fathers’ and 
sons’ incomes. Forming 19.3 percent of the P99–99.9 group, they are 21 times more likely to 
appear in this group as compared with random assignment. At the same time as many as 11.9 
percent (in contrast to 25 percent with independence) in the group with the richest fathers 
show up in the P0–25 group of sons. Large upward steps from the bottom half of the distribu-
tion to the very top does not exist in our data, but a non-negligible fraction (0.3 percent in 
contrast to 0.9 percent) move to the P99–99.9 fractile of sons.   
 
The results for earnings are similar to those for total income in most of the distribution, but 
again there are important differences. In the very top 2.3 percent of the sons of fathers in the 
P99.9–100 group show up in the corresponding group. This makes them 23 times as likely to 
appear there when compared to independent assignment. Even though this is a high number it 
is much lower than the 73 times more likely than under random assignment found when look-  12
ing at income. Similarly, 9.3 percent of sons with fathers in the top 0.1 end up in the P99–99.9 
group in the son distribution. This makes them about 10 times more likely to be there as com-
pared to random assignment but at the same time it is a significantly lower number than the 
corresponding 21 for the income results.    
 
[Table 4] 
4.  Robustness analyses 
In our main sample we require positive observations for all years and also require that we 
have observations for the sons’ transmission mechanism variables. The reason is that we want 
to conduct the mechanism analysis on the same sample as the one for which we have our main 
results. This procedure, however, creates different samples for earnings and incomes and also 
means that we loose a relatively large number of observations. Clearly we want to make sure 
that our results are not sensitive to this.
24 
 
We start by asking whether the difference in results for income and earnings is in any way 
driven by the fact that the estimations in Tables 2 and 3 were done on two different samples. 
In rows 1a and 1b of Table 5 (piecewise linear) and Table 6 (quantile regressions), we report 
estimates for the same models as in Table 2 and 3, but requiring that fathers had both positive 
incomes and positive earnings each year 1974–1979 (giving us the same sample when esti-
mating earnings and incomes, respectively). The results are similar to those in our main speci-
fication, suggesting that the differences in results between income and earnings are not due to 
the differences in the samples. 
 
Next we check how our results change if we include observations with zero reported income 
or earnings (in one or several years). We treat these zeros as missing values, i.e. average in-
come over the years for which we have positive reported values, which is approximately the 
same as interpolating over the zeros. We do so because we think that for the most part they 
are likely to reflect some form of reporting problem or mistake. While it may be the case that 
individuals that have studied the whole year, been unemployed the whole year or left the labor 
force (for retirement or something else) for the whole year, have zero income from work it is 
in most cases unlikely that they would not collect some taxable social transfers or capital in-
                                                 
24 Table A1 explains how our sample changes depending on the various requirements we introduce.   13
come. This would seem especially strange in the top of the distribution. In addition, in cases 
where the tax declaration process is not completed or if there is a dispute between the individ-
ual and the tax authorities, this is also recorded as a zero. This situation in turn seems more 
likely in the top of the distribution. In rows 2a and 2b of Table 5 (piecewise linear) and Table 
6 (quantile regressions), we report estimates when using the same requirements as in our main 
analysis but now also including observations where zeros are present. The main difference 
that we find is that the coefficients for income become slightly lower while the earnings coef-
ficients go up in the top. However, the overall picture of transmission being stronger in the 
top, and more so for income than for earnings, remains.
25  
 
Finally we consider the case where we drop the condition that we require observations of the 
sons’ transmission mechanism variables. This gives us significantly larger samples. In rows 
3a and 3b of Table 5 (piecewise linear) and Table 6 (quantile regressions), we show the re-
sults when making the same requirements as in our main regressions but also including all 
observations with positive values all years but for which we do not have the transmission me-
chanism data. In rows 4a and 4b we report the results when also allowing zero observations to 
be present. The basic results are again similar to our main results, with the exception of the 
top earnings piecewise linear regression coefficients in 3b which are lower than in the other 
specifications. 
 
[Table 5 and 6] 
 
5.  Transmission channels 
Establishing the high degree of income transmission from father to son in the top of the distri-
bution obviously raises questions about its sources. Why is it that the intergenerational associ-
ation is so strong in the top? What is it that sons of income rich fathers inherit that translates 
into such a strong income relation? Even though one may interpret the differences between 
the results for earnings and total income as indicative of the importance of capital, questions 
                                                 
25 We have also checked what happens when we treat zeros as being correct and include these values when aver-
aging. This results in coefficients where the earnings transmission is even stronger in the piecewise linear regres-
sions (but not in the quantile regressions). The general non-linear pattern remains. Treating zeros as correct also 
introduces the problem of using the log of averages or the average of logs when calculating the long run income. 
We have tried different specifications and these all show qualitatively similar results (available from the authors 
upon request).   14
remain and there is no general method that can be used to answer them.
26 The basic problem 
is that just about every plausible factor can work directly as well as indirectly through a num-
ber of different channels. Assets, education, intelligence, and social skills can all have effects 
on each other as well as directly on income and they can be transmitted from one generation 
to the next through various processes.  
 
A seemingly straightforward approach would have been to estimate a recursive system of eq-
uations in which parental income is allowed to have an indirect impact on income-enhancing 
variables (such as IQ) in one equation, and a direct effect (net of IQ) in another equation. 
With estimates from such equations the total “effect” could be disentangled into direct and 
indirect ones. However, it is well known that such a system of equations requires strong iden-
tifying assumptions. In particular the error terms in the equations must be uncorrelated, which 
typically seems a strong assumption. Here we limit ourselves to looking for suggestive evi-
dence about variables that can, and cannot, account for the dramatic discontinuity in income 
transmission in the very top of the fathers’ income distribution. Our approach is to simply 
change the left-hand variable in our basic model, i.e., son’s income, to be other son outcomes 
that capture possible channels of transmission such as IQ, non-cognitive skills, education and 
wealth. If the association between these outcomes and father income is positive, this indicates 
a potential channel of transmission. If, on the other hand, there is no association, or if it turns 
out to be negative, it seems difficult to construct a model where this particular factor plays a 
role in explaining the positive income association across generations.  
 
We use six different measures of four plausible transmission mechanisms: IQ, non-cognitive 
skills, education, and three different measures of wealth, namely net worth, financial assets, 
and taxable wealth. For the IQ, non-cognitive skills and education measures we also run sepa-
rate regressions using dummy variables for the highest level of achievement since we are 
looking for variables that can explain income and earnings at the very top.  
 
Table 7 reports descriptive statistics by fathers’ income and earnings fractiles. These statistics 
themselves are suggestive about which mechanisms are important in the top and which are 
not. In the income sample, IQ, non-cognitive skills and education increase over the distribu-
tion until the very top where the variables actually fall a bit. In contrast, all indicators of 
                                                 
26 Goldberger (1989) points to the general difficulty of disentangling various processes behind intergenerational 
transmissions. Solon (1999) includes a comprehensive discussion of this.    15
wealth rise markedly in the top and particularly when moving from P99–99.9 to P99.9–100. 
In the earnings sample, the three skill measures are either stable or declining slightly in the 
very top whereas the wealth indicators again increase markedly. The level of wealth in the top 






In Table 8 and 9 we turn to the piecewise linear income and earnings regressions, which are 
estimated within the fractiles of fathers’ income and earnings. In addition to estimates for the 
raw mediating variables, we report estimates for dummy variables for the highest level of IQ, 
non-cognitive skills and education, as well as the log of the wealth variables.
28 The results 
from the descriptive tables hold up even when we look at transmission within the top income 
fractiles. Whereas all skill variables are positive at least up through P95–99, they are always 
insignificant (often even with a negative point estimate) in the very top. Thus, we find it most 
unlikely that skill is an important mediating variable for the strong income and earnings 
transmission in the very top. Wealth, on the other hand, looks very different in the top of the 
distribution. For income, the coefficients are always positive and clearly significantly differ-
ent from zero except when taxable wealth in measured in absolute terms when the t-ratio is 
only 1.28.  
 
We summarize the results for income in Figure 3. For earnings, the coefficients are also posi-
tive but not always significantly so and the logged variables (which express elasticities) are 
lower than for income. We summarize the results for earnings in Figure 4. 
 
[Table 8 and 9; Figure 3 and 4] 
 
                                                 
27 The strong earnings transmission in the top also suggests that there may be labor market channels that we do 
not consider here. Corak and Piraino (2011) find interesting strong transmission of employees in the top that are 
likely to be part of explaining non-linearities in earnings transmission. 
28 High IQ, non-cognitive skills and education are dummy variables equal to one when sons are approximately in 
the top five percentiles in the respective distributions.   16
6.  Concluding discussion 
Our results have implications for the study of intergenerational mobility in general as well as 
for understanding mobility in Sweden. Analogously to what has previously been established 
in the top income literature, we conclude that it is crucial to study even small fractions within 
the top of the distribution to get a more complete picture of intergenerational mobility. Dis-
cussing “the top” as consisting of the top 20, top 10, or even the top 5 percent, runs the risk of 
missing important aspects. Indeed, our most striking results do not appear until within the top 
percentile. Furthermore, as is also suggested by the top income literature, it is important to 
separate different sources of income, in particular to distinguish between earnings and income 
including capital income. Both the degree of transmission as well as the channels is likely to 
be different depending on source of income. 
 
With respect to mobility in Sweden, our main finding is that intergenerational transmission of 
income is remarkably strong in the very top of the distribution and that the most likely me-
chanism for this is inherited wealth. However, our results also confirm what previous work 
has shown, namely that transmission is relatively low in general. A possible interpretation of 
this, alluded to in the title of the paper, is that family background plays a relatively small role 
in determining people’s economic outcomes in general, but at the same time “capitalist dynas-
ties” in the very top of the distribution persist. Interestingly, this picture is well in line with an 
often-heard characterization of Sweden as a society that has tried to combine high egalitarian 
ambitions with good investment incentives for large capital holders. 
 
In an international comparative perspective, our results give rise to two alternative interpreta-
tions. Either the combination of high overall earnings mobility and extremely high income 
transmission in the top is a unique feature of the extensive welfare state, perhaps even a con-
sequence of a particular “Nordic model”, or, alternatively, income persistence in the top is just 
as high, or even higher, in societies like the U.S. where overall mobility is lower than in Swe-
den. Determining which is right requires studies of top income mobility for other countries.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for main income and earnings samples. 
Variable Type Mean  S.D.  Min P10 P50 P90 P95 P99  P99.9  Max
Fathers:            
Age in 1979 
Inc.  45.1  7.2 27 36 44 55 58 64 73 86
Earn. 44.7  6.8 28 36 44 54 57 62 69 81
Income in 1979 
Inc.  252 140    137 227 382 470 751 1,313  12,263
Earn. 258 127    157 232 386 472 740 1,213 4,573
Average income 
1974–1979 
Inc.  254 137  3 151 226 379 467 756 1,280  13,950
Earn. 256 122  1 160 229 382 466 740 1,157 4,467
Average log  
income 1974–1979 
Inc.  12.34 0.42  7.74 11.89 12.32 12.84 13.04 13.52 14.02 16.39
Earn. 12.32 0.56  6.88 11.94 12.33 12.85 13.04 13.50 13.95 15.24
Sons:          
Age in 2005 
Inc.  40.9  2.0 38 38 41 44 44 45 45 45
Earn. 40.9  2.0 38 38 41 44 44 45 45 45
Income in 2005 
Inc.  357 431    180 299 546 689 1,292 4,592  45,223
Earn. 351 224    187 309 548 675 1,093 2,834  10,802
Average income 
1996–2005 
Inc.  304 283    173 265 452 553 920 3,099  43,346
Earn. 302 165  3 177 272 453 540 806 1,981  13,051
Average log  
income 1996–2005 
Inc.  12.46 0.48  3.13 11.98 12.47 12.98 13.17 13.58 14.48 17.50
Earn. 12.46 0.49  5.94 11.91 12.49 12.99 13.17 13.54 14.32 16.10
IQ 
Inc.  5 . 2   1 . 9  135889  9  9
Earn. 5 . 3   1 . 9  135889  9  9
Non-cognitive 
skills 
Inc.  5 . 2   1 . 6  135789  9  9
Earn. 5 . 3   1 . 6  135789  9  9
Education years 
Inc.  12.0  2.1  7 9 11 15 16 18 20 20
Earn. 12.1  2.1  7 9 11 15 16 20 20 20
Net worth 
Inc.  378 2,596  –24,371 –136 120 1,023 1,643 3,938 12,500  734,300
Earn. 360 1,163  –24,371 –130 133 993 1,552 3,600 12,000 78,190
Financial assets 
Inc.  145 2,361  0 0 27 314 558 1,482  6,433  746,400
Earn. 137 618  0 0 30 315 553 1,479 5,917  64,115
Taxable wealth 
Inc.  46 546  –1,991 0 0 0 91 1,202 5,178  85,112
Earn. 44 509  –1,908 0 0 0 91 1,202 4,826  85,112
Note: The income (earnings) sample consists of father-son pairs with positive income (earnings) all years. In-
comes, earnings and all wealth measures are in thousand 2005 SEK. IQ and non-cognitive skills are in Stanine 
scale. Observations are 108,277 (incomes) and 85,848 (earnings). Fathers are observed during 1974–1979 and 
sons in 1996–2005 (except for Net worth and Financial assets which are averages based on the period 1999–
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Table 2: Main Results. Piecewise linear regressions across fathers’ fractiles 
 
 Global    Piecewise  linear 
 P0–100    P0–90  P90–95  P95–99  P99–99.9  P99.9–100 
Incomes:           
Father  income 0.260    0.220 0.278 0.244 0.606 0.959 
 (0.004)    (0.005)  (0.133) (0.070) (0.174) (0.242) 
Pr(           )     [0.000]  [0.892]  [0.820] [0.047] [0.004] 
N 108,277    97,449  5,414  4,331  974  109 
Earnings:           
Father  earnings  0.168    0.125 0.335 0.187 0.558 0.507 
 (0.004)    (0.004)  (0.152) (0.072) (0.200) (0.173) 
Pr(           )     [0.000]  [0.272]  [0.789] [0.051] [0.050] 
N 85,848    77,263  4,292  3,434  773  86 
Note: Results based on estimating equation (1). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. P-values from test of 
equality with the OLS coefficient are in brackets. Constant term suppressed.  
 
 
Table 3: Quantile regressions across sons’ conditional fractiles 
 
 Median  (Q50)  Q90  Q95  Q99  Q99.9 
       
Father  income 0.232 0.328 0.334 0.380 0.536 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.014) (0.035) 
Pr(           )    [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
       
Father  earnings  0.160 0.168 0.157 0.158 0.242 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.019) 
Pr(           )    [0.026] [0.591] [0.823] [0.000] 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors (using 100 replications) in parenthesis. P-values from χ
2-test of coefficient 
equality with the median ( 50) regression coefficient are in brackets. Sample sizes are 108,277 for incomes and 
85,848 for earnings. 
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Table 4: Transition matrices 
 
a) Incomes 
  Son’s income fractile 
  P0–25  P25–50 P50–75 P75–90 P90–95 P95–99  P99–99.9  P99.9–100  
Father’s income 
fractile:             
P0–25  33.2 29.3 22.9 10.1  2.6  1.5  0.3  0.0  100.0
P25–50  26.0 29.8 27.2 11.9  3.0  1.8  0.3  0.0  100.0
P50–75  22.4 25.0 28.3 16.0  4.5  3.2  0.6  0.0  100.0
P75–90  19.6 18.6 24.2 21.1  8.2  6.9  1.3  0.2  100.0
P90–95  16.8 13.2 20.5 24.5 11.5 10.4  2.8  0.4  100.0
P95–99  16.4 11.3 15.8 23.4 13.3 14.9  4.5  0.4  100.0
P99–99.9  16.3  7.4  11.3 19.8 15.3 21.7  6.4  1.8  100.0
P99.9–100  11.9  3.7  8.3  11.9 10.1 27.5 19.3  7.3  100.0
 
b) Earnings 
  Son’s earnings fractile 
  P0–25  P25–50 P50–75 P75–90 P90–95 P95–99  P99–99.9  P99.9–100  
Father’s earnings 
fractile:             
P0–25  32.5 29.7 23.0 10.1  2.7  1.7  0.3  0.0  100.0
P25–50  26.5 29.8 26.9 11.7  2.9  1.8  0.3  0.0  100.0
P50–75  22.8 24.6 28.0 15.8  4.7  3.3  0.6  0.1  100.0
P75–90  19.3 18.3 24.4 21.4  8.4  6.8  1.4  0.2  100.0
P90–95  17.2 14.0 21.7 23.0 10.4 10.3  2.9  0.4  100.0
P95–99  15.7 11.4 16.3 25.6 12.7 13.9  4.0  0.4  100.0
P99–99.9  15.8  7.1  13.6 21.7 14.5 19.1  7.0  1.2  100.0
P99.9–100  10.5  4.7  12.8 17.4 12.8 30.2  9.3  2.3  100.0
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Table 5: Robustness analysis: Piecewise linear regressions (incomes and earnings) 
 
 Global    Piecewise  linear 
 P0–100    P0–90  P90–95  P95–99  P99–99.9  P99.9–100 
Alt. sample 1: Main sample, but require both positive income and earnings all years 
1a.  Father  income  0.293    0.249 0.341 0.262 0.582 0.878 
 (0.004)    (0.006)  (0.129) (0.068) (0.162) (0.251) 
Pr(              )      [0.000] [0.711] [0.652] [0.074] [0.020] 
N 85,753    77,177  4,288  3,430  772  86 
           
1b. Father earnings  0.168    0.125  0.334  0.189  0.526  0.507 
 (0.004)    (0.004)  (0.153) (0.072) (0.199) (0.173) 
Pr(              )      [0.000] [0.275] [0.762] [0.072] [0.050] 
N 85,753    77,177  4,288  3,430  772  86 
Alt. sample 2: Main sample, but also include observations with zeros (although exclude zeros from averages) 
2a.  Father  income  0.248    0.220 0.168 0.154 0.474 0.848 
 (0.005)    (0.006)  (0.154) (0.087) (0.275) (0.212) 
Pr(              )      [0.000] [0.599] [0.278] [0.412] [0.005] 
N 117,837    106,050  5,894  4,713  1,062  118 
           
2b. Father earnings  0.132    0.099  0.280  0.167  0.696  0.831 
 (0.003)    (0.003)  (0.162) (0.084) (0.209) (0.201) 
Pr(              )      [0.000] [0.360] [0.676] [0.007] [0.001] 
N 116,366    104,720  5,821  4,658  1,049  118 
Alt. sample 3: Main sample, but also include observations where sons lack any of the transmission variables  
3a.  Father  income  0.262    0.225 0.245 0.220 0.381 0.752 
 (0.004)    (0.005)  (0.122) (0.065) (0.160) (0.247) 
Pr(              )      [0.000] [0.887] [0.511] [0.455] [0.048] 
N 130,047    117,042  6,502  5,202  1,170  131 
           
3b. Father earnings  0.169    0.126  0.269  0.152  0.372  0.251 
 (0.003)    (0.004)  (0.138) (0.070) (0.176) (0.359) 
Pr(              )      [0.000] [0.468] [0.809] [0.249] [0.818] 
N 101,635    91,471  5,082  4,065  915  102 
Alt. sample 4: Same as alt. sample 3, but include observations with zeros (but exclude zeros from averages) 
4a.  Father  income  0.251    0.227 0.122 0.128 0.404 0.734 
 (0.005)    (0.005)  (0.141) (0.079) (0.235) (0.212) 
Pr(              )      [0.001] [0.360] [0.121] [0.515] [0.023] 
N 142,046    127,834  7,106  5,683  1,280  143 
           
4b. Father earnings  0.134    0.102  0.245  0.087  0.530  0.569 
 (0.003)    (0.003)  (0.152) (0.080) (0.191) (0.273) 
Pr(              )      [0.000] [0.466] [0.554] [0.039] [0.112] 
N 139,210    125,257  6,966  5,587  1,261  139 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. P-values from a test of coefficient equality with the OLS coeffi-
cient are in brackets. 
    24
Table 6: Robustness analysis: Quantile regressions (incomes and earnings) 
 
  Q50 Q90 Q95 Q99  Q99.9 
Alt. sample 1: Positive income and earnings all years + all sons’ transmisson variables 
1a.  Father  income  0.274 0.375 0.384 0.455 0.642 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.021) (0.041) 
Pr(           )    [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
       
1b.Father  earnings  0.159 0.168 0.157 0.158 0.242 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.014) 
Pr(           )    [0.026] [0.591] [0.823] [0.000] 
Alt. sample 2: Main sample +observations with zeros, but treat the zero years as missing 
2a.  Father  income  0.214 0.275 0.259 0.263 0.312 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)  (0.01)  (0.022) 
Pr(           )    [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
       
2b. Father earnings  0.106  0.117  0.116  0.119  0.165 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.017) 
Pr(           )    [0.001] [0.004] [0.049] [0.001] 
Alt. sample 3: Same requirements as for the main sample but no requirement on transmission variables. 
3a.  Father  income  0.233 0.331 0.338 0.381 0.531 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) 
Pr(           )    [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
       
3b. Father earnings  0.158  0.169  0.16  0.164  0.252 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) 
Pr(           )    [0.059] [0.755] [0.303] [0.000] 
Alt. sample 4: Same as sample 3, but include observations with zeros (but exclude zeros from averages) 
4a.  Father  income  0.218 0.279 0.267 0.268 0.312 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012) 
Pr(           )    [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
       
4b. Father earnings  0.109  0.118  0.117  0.12  0.165 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
Pr(           )    [0.123] [0.137] [0.041] [0.000] 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors (using 100 replications) in parenthesis. P-values from χ
2-test of coefficient 
equality with the median ( 50) regression coefficient are in brackets. Sample sizes are 85,753 (1a and 1b), 
117,837 (2a), 116,365 (2b), 130,047 (3a), 101,635 (3b), 142,046 (4a) and 139,210 (4b). 
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Table 7: Transmission mechanisms: Descriptive statistics 
 
a) Incomes 
    Sons with fathers in the following income fractile: 
Son variables    P0–90  P90–95  P95–99  P99–99.9  P99.9–100 
Income  Mean  289 394 452 581  1,498 
  (S.d.)  (206) (334) (466) (812)  (4,453) 
IQ  Mean  5.1 6.3 6.5 6.7 6.3 
  (S.d.)  (1.9) (1.7) (1.7) (1.6) (1.7) 
Non-cog.  skills  Mean  5.1 5.8 6.0 6.2 6.1 
  (S.d.)  (1.6) (1.6) (1.6) (1.6) (1.7) 
Net worth  Mean  311  647  944  2,575  6,387 
 (S.d.)  (912)  (1,798)  (2,803)  (24,417)  (16,208) 
Financial assets  Mean  113  254  363  1,537  2,853 
 (S.d.)  (474)  (887)  (1,243)  (24,454)  (7,624) 
Taxable wealth  Mean  28  111  210  554  2,488 
 (S.d.)  (325)  (775)  (1,006)  (2,321)  (9,099) 
Education  years  Mean  11.8 13.4 13.8 14.4 13.8 
  (S.d.)  (2.0) (2.3) (2.4) (2.4) (2.4) 
N    97,519 5,416  4,300  941  101 
 
b) Earnings 
    Sons with fathers in the following earnings fractile: 
Son variables    P0–90  P90–95  P95–99  P99–99.9  P99.9–100 
Earnings  Mean  290 383 423 477 583 
  (S.d.)  (138) (229) (353) (338) (430) 
IQ  Mean  5.2 6.4 6.6 6.8 6.5 
  (S.d.)  (1.8) (1.7) (1.7) (1.6) (1.7) 
Non-cog.  skills  Mean  5.2 5.9 6.0 6.3 6.3 
  (S.d.)  (1.5) (1.6) (1.6) (1.5) (1.6) 
Net worth  Mean  307  677  877  1,363  3,627 
  (S.d.) (928)  (2,019) (1,949) (3,805) (8,175) 
Financial  assets  Mean  114 275 350 566  1,999 
  (S.d.) (452)  (1,244) (1,174) (1,882) (5,483) 
Taxable wealth  Mean  27  123  212  364  2,277 
 (S.d.)  (252)  (863)  (1,112)  (1,512)  (10,025) 
Education  years  Mean  11.9 13.5 13.9 14.6 14.0 
  (S.d.)  (2.0) (2.3) (2.3) (2.3) (2.2) 
N    77,327 4,306  3,393  745  77 
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Table 8: Mechanisms of transmission: top incomes 
 












P0–90  0.220 0.938 0.097 0.648 0.052 1.205  0.136 
  (0.004) (0.019) (0.003) (0.016) (0.002) (0.021)  (0.003) 
P90–95 0.278 1.161 0.249 0.977 0.165 1.726  0.471 
  (0.129) (0.399) (0.102) (0.363) (0.077) (0.527)  (0.109) 
P95–99 0.244 0.751 0.143 0.646 0.150 1.723  0.339 
  (0.068) (0.183) (0.052) (0.180) (0.044) (0.270)  (0.055) 
P99–99.9 0.606  0.017  -0.064  1.131  0.042  -0.752 0.071 
  (0.181) (0.422) (0.125) (0.377) (0.107) (0.615)  (0.135) 
P99.9–100 0.959  0.027  -0.116  -0.900  -0.115  -0.377  -0.013 
  (0.230) (0.357) (0.095) (0.419) (0.081) (0.512)  (0.124) 
















P0–90  44,576 0.227 1.125 64,359 1.166 30,372 0.324  0.312 
 (10,003)  (0.021)  (0.057)  (5,323) (0.040) (3,020) (0.033)  (0.031) 
P90–95  1,717,360  1.602  4.143 581,102 2.240 579,264 3.895  3.693 
  (551,264) (0.366)  (1.249) (228,001) (0.746) (254,568) (1.072)  (1.020) 
P95–99  1,133,324  0.872  1.111 489,117 1.289 607,793 3.795  3.451 
  (348,117) (0.174)  (0.619) (128,797) (0.346) (136,805) (0.629)  (0.594) 
P99–99.9 6,412,201 1.826  3.340 2,803,406 2.499 2,287,123 7.847  7.395 
 (2,170,916)  (0.432)  (1.327)  (1,414,553) (0.697) (850,186) (1.763)  (1.713) 
P99.9–100 20,303,567  1.684  3.198  12,197,353 3.158  5,646,754 5.767  5.753 
 (7,458,157)  (0.336)  (1.379)  (4,286,513) (0.544) (4,397,791) (2.166)  (2.112) 
N  (total)  108,277  73,732 108,277 108,277 108,277 108,277 102,515  108,277 
Note: The dependent variable is specified in column headings and independent variable is father income. Sepa-
rate regressions are run for different father income fractiles, with N showing the aggregate number of observa-
tions. Constant terms are suppressed. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. High IQ, non-cognitive skills and 
education are dummy variables equal to one when sons are in roughly the top five percentiles in the respective 
distributions. Wealth variables are in Swedish currency or logged ditto. “Positive” wealth means that all observa-
tions with negative or zero wealth are replaced by one (which in log form becomes zero). For further details of 
variables and methods, see Table 1 and the text.  
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Table 9: Mechanisms of transmission: top earnings 
 












P0–90  0.125 0.367 0.040 0.212 0.021 0.553  0.066 
  (0.003) (0.015) (0.003) (0.012) (0.002) (0.017)  (0.003) 
P90–95 0.335 0.954 0.280 0.748 0.158 1.058  0.298 
  (0.148) (0.455) (0.122) (0.419) (0.094) (0.612)  (0.130) 
P95–99 0.187 0.763 0.163 0.599 0.166 1.600  0.330 
  (0.072) (0.213) (0.061) (0.210) (0.053) (0.311)  (0.065) 
P99–99.9 0.558  –0.146 –0.049  0.987  0.061  -0.528 0.029 
  (0.218) (0.541) (0.164) (0.476) (0.135) (0.798)  (0.170) 
P99.9–100 0.507  –0.187  –0.191 –1.141 –0.032 -1.630 -0.267 
  (0.290) (0.651) (0.222) (1.152) (0.220) (1.025)  (0.238) 
















P0–90 -133,761  -0.094  0.088  6,872  0.201 2,811  -0.087  -0.073 
 (12,394)  (0.013)  (0.042)  (3,293) (0.027)  (2,204) (0.031) (0.029) 
P90–95 1,518,510  1.426  4.005 721,186 2.372 549,901 3.841  3.704 
 (467,287)  (0.411)  (1.456)  (295,688) (0.845)  (208,487) (1.257)  (1.202) 
P95–99 898,129  0.751 0.996  314,850  1.194  487,796  3.383 3.107 
 (229,907)  (0.187)  (0.707)  (122,999) (0.387)  (121,232) (0.724)  (0.683) 
P99–99.9 2,158,355  0.641  3.723  519,832  2.577  398,132  5.862  5.555 
 (1,200,581)  (0.509)  (1.640)  (461,338) (0.825)  (356,693) (2.120)  (2.032) 
P99.9–100 12,619,482  1.620  1.752  8,077,958 3.103  15,946,230  7.471  6.215 
 (8,927,638)  (0.781)  (3.101)  (6,358,300) (1.143) (13,186,815) (3.636)  (3.396) 
N (total)  85,848  59,816  85,848  85,848 85,848  85,848 81,415 85,848 
Note: The dependent variable is specified in column headings and independent variable is father earnings. Sepa-
rate regressions are run for different father earnings fractiles, with N showing the aggregate number of observa-
tions. Constant terms are suppressed. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. High IQ, non-cognitive skills and 
education are dummy variables equal to one when sons are in roughly the top five percentiles in the respective 
distributions. Wealth variables are in Swedish currency or logged ditto. “Positive” wealth means that all observa-
tions with negative or zero wealth are replaced by one (which in log form becomes zero). For further details of 
variables and methods, see Table 1 and the text. 
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Table A1: Structure of attrition. 
 
  Number of observations 
  Income Earnings 
1. All sons, born in Sweden in 1960–1967 and part of the multigenerational 
register, registered as living in Sweden all years 1996–2005.  151,148 151,148 
2. All sons in 1 and with at least one positive income (earnings) observation.  150,902  148,612 
3. All sons in 1 and with 10 positive income (earnings) observations.  142,716  126,045 
4. All sons in 3 with a known biological father.  140,710  124,379 
5. All sons in 4 with a biological father who was registered in Sweden all years 
1974–1979.  134,673 119,300 
6. All sons in 5 with a biological father who has at least one positive income 
(earnings) observation.  134,599 118,638 
7. All sons in 6 with a biological father who has positive income (earnings) 
observations all years 1974–1979.  130,047 101,635 
8. All sons in 7 for whom we also observe IQ, non-cognitive skills and educa-
tion.  108,277 85,848 
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Figure 1: Income transmission across the distribution 
 
Note: Intergenerational elasticities and corresponding error bands are based on results reported in Table 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Earnings transmission across the distribution 
 

















































































Figure 3: Mechanisms of income transmission 
 
Note: The figure shows estimated intergenerational elasticities as reported in Table 8. 
 
 
Figure 4: Mechanisms of earnings transmission 
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